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BANKRUPTCY
LAWRENCE KALEVITCH*

In reviewing the bankruptcy developments in the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, this article will discuss noteworthy cases involving discharge,
set-off and railroad reorganization. With some discomfort is anything written on bankruptcy law at present, for the Congress continues to consider
reform of the bankruptcy law. Except as noted, however, this survey of
recent decisions in the Seventh Circuit foresees no change in the matters
discussed here by the Congress in the near future.
DISCHARGE

In the past year, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided
several cases in the discharge area.I The most interesting of the discharge
cases is In re Sotelo 2 in which the Seventh Circuit departed from precedent
set in other circuits.' In that case, the Seventh Circuit construed section
6672 of the Internal Revenue Code, 4 and held dischargeable a liability
arising out of the bankrupt's failure to account to the United States for
withholding taxes of employees of the corporation of which the bankrupt
5
was chief executive officer.
In Sotelo, the bankrupt conceded liability pursuant to the provision of
section 6672 of the Code, 6 but argued that this liability is dischargeable
despite the Bankruptcy Act's limited exception from discharge of tax liabili* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; J.D., St.
Louis University; LL.M., New York University. The author gratefully acknowledges the
superb research assistance of Ms. Susan Bogart, Class of 1978, Loyola University of Chicago
School of Law.
I. In re Sotelo, 551 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 54 (1977); In re Jones,
560 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1977); In re Woods, 561 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1977).
2. 551 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 54 (1977).
3. See In re Murphy, 533 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1976); Westenberg v. United States, 285 F.
Supp. 915 ( D. Ariz. 1968); Lynn v. Scanlon, 234 F. Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Sherwood v.
United States, 228 F. Supp. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
4. I.R.C. § 6672.
5. 551 F.'2d at 1092.
6. I.R.C. § 6672 provides that:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title who wilfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and
pay over such tax, or wilfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax
or the payment therefore, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be
liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not
accounted for and paid over. No penalty shall be imposed under section 6653 for any
offense to which this section is applicable. (emphasis added).
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ty. 7 The court agreed with the bankrupt's contention, and found this liability
dischargeable by construing the term "tax" as used in the Bankruptcy Act
more narrowly than it is construed by other courts within the context of the
Internal Revenue Code.8 The court rejected decisions from other jurisdictions which had taken the view that liability under section 6672 of the
Code is in the nature of a tax rather than a penalty which would be
dischargeable, 9 characterizing these decisions as lacking sufficient analysis
to override Congress' denomination of the section 6672 liability as a "penalty."' 10 Moreover, and of probably more importance to the decision of
Sotelo, the court recognized the policy implication of a failure to discharge
this debt. The court felt that the policy of the Bankruptcy Act in favor of a
fresh start, noticed as "basic," should not be overcome by a liability under
the tax law which lacks any nexus with the bankrupt's personal tax affairs
absent a clear congressional intent."
Thus, Sotelo presented the narrow statutory interpretation issue, that
is, whether section 6672 liability is nondischargeable for purposes of section
17 of the Bankruptcy Act, as well as the broad issue of policy favoring fresh
economic start, for which an affirmative response to the narrow issue would
tend to be frustrating. Despite the clearly contrary case law which seemed to
this court to rest on narrow analogy without due regard for the fresh start
policy, Sotelo does give the questions raised fuller treatment and a more
convincing resolution.
The Seventh Circuit also faced an interesting procedural question with
respect to discharge practice in the case of In re Jones. 2 The Bankruptcy
Rules provide that cause must be shown for the bankruptcy court to hear an
untimely application for an exception to discharge regardless of whether the
13
application be formally made by a creditor or on the court's own motion.
In Jones, the court overlooked the new Bankruptcy Rules practice change
on untimely requests for exceptions to a grant or discharge, 14 and held that
the bankruptcy judge may hear an untimely application for exception under
section 17a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act in the court's discretion and apparently
even if cause has not been shown. 5 That this had been the court's preroga-

7. See Bankruptcy Act § 17a(I), II U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (1970).
8. 551 F.2d at 1092.
9. See cases cited at note 3 supra.
10. 551 F.2d at 1092. See the emphasized language of section 6672 of the IRC cited at note
6 supra.
11. 551 F.2d at 1092-93.
12. 560 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1977).
13. Bankruptcy Rules 409(a)(2), 404(c), 906(b), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 409(a)(2), 404(c),

906(b) (1977).
14. See text accompanying notes 18-20 infra.
15. 560 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1977).
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tive prior to the new Rules seems clear; 16 that this discretion now may not be
exercised without cause seems likewise clear. 17
The importance of the procedural issue in Jones stems from recent
changes in the dischargeability law. Prior to 1970, the bankruptcy court
primarily concerned itself with granting discharges. The question of exception from discharge grants was largely left to the determination of other
courts, usually when the bankrupt debtor pleaded his discharge grant as a
bar to the creditor's suit for the debt.' 8 Substantial dissatisfaction in several
areas led the Congress to amend section 17 in 1970 to provide that a creditor
with an exception under section 17a(2), (4) or (8) must litigate his exception
before the bankruptcy court lest the debt be discharged under the bankruptcy
court's order of discharge.' 9 Thus, a creditor who fails to satisfy the
timeliness rules in tendering his claimed exception under these provisions
20
risks loss of his exception.
The procedure in the bankruptcy court for the hearing of applications
for exceptions from discharge under section 17a of the Bankruptcy Act is
governed both by the Act and its Rules. Under the Act, the bankruptcy court
shall make an order fixing the time for the filing of applications for
exceptions from discharge, which shall not be less than thirty nor more than
ninety days after the first meeting of creditors.2 1 Notice of this order is to be
given to all creditors.22 The Act then provides the language relied on in
Jones: "The Court may, upon its own motion or, for cause shown, upon
motion of any party in interest, extend the time or times for filing such...
applications.' '23 In Jones, the circuit court deemed the bankruptcy judge to
have extended the time on his own motion since that judge had entertained
the exception beyond the time provided in his order and had not considered
24
the timeliness issue, at least as shown in the record.
In conflict with both the quoted sentence of the Bankruptcy Act and the
Jones court's application is Bankruptcy Rule 409(a)(2), which authorizes
16. Bankruptcy Act § 17c(2), 11 U.S.C. § 35(c)(2) (1970) which provides that "unless an
application is timely filed, the debt shall be discharged" must be read in conjunction with the
last sentence of Bankruptcy Act § 14b(1), 11 U.S.C. § 32(b)(1) (1970), which provides that
"[t]he Court may, upon its own motion or, for cause shown, upon motion of any party in
interest, extend the time .... "
17. See the Bankruptcy Rules cited at note 13 supra and text accompanying note 25 infra.
18. Exceptionally, the bankruptcy court could determine the dischargeability of a particular debt upon the application of a bankrupt. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
For an excellent in-depth recitation of the pre-1970 situation and the legislative history of the
1970 amendments to the dischargeability law cited at note 19 infra, see I BANKRUPTCY ACT AND
RULES, 58-63 (Collier pamphlet ed. 1975).
19. See generally Bankruptcy Act § 17c, 11 U.S.C. § 35(c) (1970).
20. Bankruptcy Act § 17c(2), 11 U.S.C. § 35(c)(2) (1970).
21. Bankruptcy Act § 14b(l), II U.S.C. § 32(b)(1) (1970).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 560 F.2d at 777-78.
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extensions for filing a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt
for cause only, whether the extension issue arises by party motion or sua
sponte. 25 Under the Rules' enabling statute, such a conflict between the Act
and the Rules on a procedural matter is controlled by the Rules. 26 Regrettably, however, the court ignored the rule requiring cause to be shown,
though one might assume, as the court may have, that the bankruptcy court
27
had found cause for its extension of time.
Finally, in the area of discharge the Seventh Circuit considered again
the plight of the divorced person whose former spouse attempts in bankrupt28
cy to obtain a discharge of a debt created in a divorce property settlement.
The Bankruptcy Act bars discharge of debts "for alimony due or to become
due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child.' '29 In In re Woods ,30
the court adhered to settled cases 31 in distinguishing debt created by property
settlement proximate to divorce from alimony or support obligations under
the exception statute. As some commentators have noted, 32 the Proposed
Bankruptcy Act of the Bankruptcy Commission would eliminate this distinction. 33 However, it should be noted that the version of the Bankruptcy Act
approved by the United States House of Representatives during the First
Session of the Ninety-fifth Congress speaks without substantive change to
this particular dischargeability issue; section 523(a)(5) of that version regards debt "to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony
to, maintenance for, or support of, such spouse or child" as nondischargeable.3 Lamentably, as matters have stood, divorce settlements made without expert planning in light of the likelihood of a bankruptcy discharge
continue to be treacherous.
SET-OFF UNDER SECTION 68A

In what would seem to have been a pat case, the court in Pabst v.
Harris Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. (In re Griswold)35 denied a partially
25. See also Bankruptcy Rules 404(c), 906(b), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 404(c), 906(b) (1977).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970) provides that the rules may not "abridge, enlarge, or modify
any substantive right" and is understood to thereby authorize procedural and practice changes
such as the time extension issue under discussion.
27. Jones suggests no ground for concluding otherwise than that the bankruptcy judge
exercised proper discretion for cause apparent or shown.
28. In re Woods, 561 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1977).
29. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1970). But see In re Wasserman, 46
U.S.L.W. 2073 (D.R.I. 1977) (holding section 17a(7) exception from discharge of alimony for
"wife" unconstitutional sex discrimination under the fifth amendment).
30. 561 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1977).
31. See, e.g., Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976).
32. See Ginsberg, Bankruptcy, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231 & n.265 (1976).
33. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Pt. II, § 4506(a)(6) (Proposed Law) (1975).
34. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 523(a)(5) (1977).
35. 559 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1977).
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secured creditor the privilege of section 68a 36 set-off because the court
found the creditor to have obtained a voidable preference under the Bankruptcy Act. 37 The court reasoned that since section 68b(1) 3 s denied set-off to
a creditor who had received a preference from the debtor's estate, the
creditor at bar, in having received a preference, was precluded by a limitation on set-off under section 68." In that view the appeal appears untroublesome. However, the case seems noteworthy in that although a sound result
is reached, the reasoning of the court is interesting and not arguably
unquestionable. After examining the court's rationale under the apparent
facts of the case, an alternative rationale will be examined which may offer
of the availability of this set-off to the
guidance on the general 4question
°
creditor.
secured
partially
In Pabst, the creditor held security interests in several vehicles of the
debtor-bankrupt which had been appropriately perfected well before bankruptcy. Although the security interests were several, no consolidation of
these debts was agreed to by the parties. Due to the debtor's default, the
creditor commenced repossession (apparently by self-help) shortly before
the filing of the bankruptcy petition and concluded these repossessions
shortly after the filing. 4 ' As is not unusual, when the creditor concluded
liquidation of its collateral it found that on some vehicles foreclosure sale
brought less than the debt secured, and on others sale brought more than the
debt secured. In the resultant position of obtaining by foreclosure less than
the aggregate of debt owed, the creditor thus faced a net loss; and its
position was ostensibly worsened by the filing of the bankruptcy trustee's
petition for an accounting and turnover of funds obtained by the collateral
sales in excess of the security interest on each vehicle. Perhaps distressed by
this petition but not undaunted, the creditor countered with a claim against
36. Bankruptcy Act § 68a, II U.S.C. § 108(a) (1970) provides: "In all cases of mutual
debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be
stated and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or
paid." This section is not to be confused with another so-called set-off provision found under
section 60 of the Act, which is entirely distinct (Bankruptcy Act § 60, I1 U.S.C. § 96 (1970)).
37. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 1i U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
38. Bankruptcy Act § 68b(l), 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(l) (1970) provides: "A set-off or
counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor of any debtor [creditor] of the bankrupt which (I) is
not provable against the estate and allowable under subdivision g of section 93 [section 57] of
this title [Act]". (For purposes of clarification, bracketed material indicates variance in language found in the Statutes at Large).
39. 559 F.2d at 454.
40. See text accompanying notes 53-54 infra.
41. As noted in the text accompanying note 50 infra, such post-petition repossession and
sale of the collateral, assuming the collateral to have passed in legal contemplation to the
trustee, seems clearly to be wrongful against the trustee. See, e.g., Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v.
Leisk, 133 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1943). The appropriate procedure to reclaim the collateral by the
secured party is to file a reclamation petition with the bankruptcy court. See generally 2 W.
COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 23.11 (14th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]; S. &
M. NADLER, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 658 (2d ed. 1972).
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the bankrupt estate in the amount of the difference between the total debt of
the bankrupt to this creditor and the total proceeds from the sale of the
collateral.
Thus, the creditor responded in a superficially attractive manner to the
trustee's seemingly correct petition to recover proceeds realized from the
"profitable" sales, that is, the surplus above the security interest held. In
looking at the transactions between creditor and debtor as a whole, it
appears that the creditor has suffered substantial loss even though the credit
extensions were properly secured. The Bankruptcy Act provides a creditor
so positioned with equity through the set-off of section 68a, which entitles a
creditor to set-off "in all cases mutual debts or mutual credits between the
estate of a bankrupt and a creditor.'"4 2 Thus, the creditor concludes that it
should be able to set-off gains and losses from the collateral sales, with the
negative balance standing as its claim as an unsecured creditor of the
estate .43 Another view, submitted to be correct, holds that this set-off would
result in preferential treatment of the creditor relative to the other creditors
of the estate who have unsecured claims. Instead of sharing the surplus
obtained from the profitable sales, that is, the excess over the security
interest, with similarly positioned unsecured creditors, this creditor would
retain the surplus, set-off that amount against the proceeds from sales which
obtained less than the security interest held, and share with other creditors
the net loss out of other assets of the estate as well.
The Seventh Circuit's resolution of the argument took an interesting
turn. Without scrutiny of whether a creditor so positioned is entitled to setoff under section 68a, the court looked to section 68b(1) 44 to deny the claim
42. See note 36 supra.
43. The secured creditor's theory in Pabst results in dividends being paid it as a general
creditor in excess of its prorated general claim against the estate. Using hypothetical figures for
convenience, the creditor files a claim against the estate for $10,000 representing a debt owed
on two notes that had been secured by two pieces of equipment. On sales of the equipment for
net prices of $6000 and $4000 (where each secured the notes promising each $5000), the creditor
contends that his gain of $1000 on one note is offset by his loss of $1000 on the other note. This
contention, however, cannot be supported since the creditor had a security interest in each
piece of equipment of only $5000. Allowing this sort of set-off deprives the other estate
claimants of their prorated share of the $1000 derived from the sale of the one piece of
equipment that produced a $1000 surplus.
A secured creditor has a provable and allowable prima facie claim against the bankruptcy
estate for a deficiency, to which that creditor is no more nor less deserving of priority over
other unsecured creditors, where a second secured claim held by the same creditor happens
fortuitously to produce a surplus on sale. Extraordinarily, the bankruptcy court may in a limited
way jump up the creditor if, for example, the creditor's production of this surplus is especially
meritorious under the rules provided by Bankruptcy Act § 64a(l), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1970).
However, that section has no apparent application to Pabst since it limits the promotion of the
deserving creditor to costs and expenses of the recovery of property. Likewise, demotion
through disallowance under section 57g may be ordered by the bankruptcy court should the
creditor have committed one of the proscribed acts thereunder and yet hold a deficiency claim.
Bankruptcy Act § 57g, I1 U.S.C. § 93(g) (1970).
44. See note 38 supra.
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and find for the trustee. That subsection bars use of set-off to any creditor
who would under section 57g 45 have a claim against the estate disallowed
for various reasons, including receipt of a preference. Finding here that
creditor had received a preference, it followed that sections 68b(1) per 57g
barred the set-off. This circuitous rationale bypasses the initial issue of
whether creditor fell within section 68a set-off. Moreover, the analysis
given by the court may be doubtful since it assumes that the creditor did
obtain a preference.

46

The preference section of the Act limits what is a preferential transfer
to those transfers occurring "within four months before bankruptcy," 47 and
in Pabst all but one repossession occurred after the bankruptcy. 48 In the
absence of disclosure in Pabst as to whether the sole pre-bankruptcy repossession resulted in proceeds on sale greater than the security interest held on
that vehicle, one cannot determine whether a preferential transfer did occur.
Nonetheless, the absence of a preference would not disturb the court's
rationale under section 68b(1) since that subsection's incorporation of the
grounds for disallowance found in section 57g includes the receipt of any
void or voidable transfer, not only a preference. 49 Since the post-bankruptcy
petition repossessions and resales seem conversions 50 of property that in
legal contemplation had passed to the trustee of the bankruptcy estate l and
into the constructive possession and jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,5 2
45. Bankruptcy Act § 57g, I1 U.S.C. § 93(g) (1970) provides: "The claims of creditors who
have received or acquired preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers, assignments, or encumbrances, void or voidable under this title [Act], shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall
surrender such preferences ....
46. The Pabst court found a preference only because the secured creditor sold seven of
the vehicles for amounts in excess of the security interests. 559 F.2d at 454.
47. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(l), II U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
48. Technically, if only the pre-bankruptcy repossession and sale obtained less than the
applicable security interest amount, under the court's reasoning no voidable preference had
been obtained. Importantly, section 57g disallowance requires a void or voidable preference,
not only an actual preference. No argument hereby, however, follows that the secured party
has a right to retain the surplus of his foreclosure because no void or voidable preference arose
thereby. See text accompanying notes 48-49 infra; see generally 3 COLLIER, supra note 41, at
57.19.
49. See note 45 supra for the text of section 57g.
50. Conversion on the theory that title has passed to the trustee under Bankruptcy Act §
70a, II U.S.C. § 10(a) (1970), and the repossession and resale thereafter of collateral constitutes a violation of the trustee's property interest as well as the automatic stay against lien
enforcement now provided by Bankruptcy Rule 601, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 601 (1977). As noted
in the Advisory Committee's Notes accompanying the Rules, whether post-petition lien enforcement against the property in the court's jurisdiction is void has split the authorities. See
Bankruptcy Rule 601, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 601 (1977) and accompanying Advisory Committee's
Notes; COLLIER, supra note 41, at 2.62(1), (2). The Advisory Committee expressed a preference for the "void" view. See Bankruptcy Rule 601, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 601 (1977) and
accompanying Advisory Committee's Notes.
51. See Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(1970); 4 A COLLIER, supra note 41, at
70.18.
52. The bankruptcy court has constructive possession of all non-exempt property of the
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this misconduct would justify disallowance and bar the set-off as well.
The question that the Pabst court left untouched concerns whether,
absent commission of conduct that would bar set-off by section 68b(1), a
creditor in the same position as the creditor in Pabst may set-off gains
against losses. It is submitted that generally the proper answer is no, since
this set-off is generally available only for a creditor with whom the bankrupt
held an open account under which the statutory requisite mutual credits or
mutual debts is satisfied. 53 A creditor who holds security for one debt, or
more, whose security is more than sufficient to satisfy the debt or debts
secured, may not retain or obtain the surplus of sale of the security to satisfy
another debt wholly unsecured or only partially secured when bankruptcy
ensues. 54
bankrupt held by the bankrupt at the filing of the petition. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 41, at
23.05.
53. Early Supreme Court opinions denied the set-off of section 68a (Bankruptcy Act §
68a, I I U.S.C. § 108(a) (1970)) to creditors who tried to credit the bankrupt's debt by retention
of property which had come into their possession and was properly includible in the bankrupt's
estate. In Libby v. Hopkins, 104 U.S. 303 (1881), the Court held the property in the creditor's
control not to be a "mutual credit or mutual debt" within the statute. Id. at 306-07. The Court
noted, and a line of subsequent decisions continues, that the creditor merely holds such
property as "trustee" for the benefit of the debtor or the estate. Id. at 309. Accord, Western
Tie & Timber Co. v. Brown, 196 U.S. 502 (1904); Brunswick Corp. v. Clements, 424 F.2d 673
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1010 (1971); Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Leisk, 133 F.2d 79
(5th Cir. 1943); Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Co. v. Maguire, 251 F. 581 (7th Cir. 1918); Continental
& Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 199 F. 581 (7th Cir. 1912),
rev'd, 229 U.S. 435 (1913); In re Gravure Paper& Board Corp., 150 F. Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1957);
In re Lykens Hosiery Mills, 141 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); In re Sandy's Novelty Corp.,
116 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). See also Ivanhoe Bldg. Ass'n. v. Orr, 295 U.S. 243 (1935).
54. This proposition knows abundant authority, but only arguable unanimity. The cases of
Brust v. Sturr, 128 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), and In re Autler, 23 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y.
1938) provide unequivocal support. In his book on the law of bankruptcy, Professor James A.
MacLachlan makes the point that distinguishes Gibson v. Central Nat'l Bank, 171 F.2d 398 (5th
Cir. 1948), the main case appearing to hold contrarily (and rejected in Brust on the authority of
Autler). MacLachlan appreciates the fact that a creditor may have an understanding with his
debtor that the creditor is secured by the collateral on more than one debt owed by the debtor
even though the legal relationship may be cloudy with respect to the securing of the second
debt. To the extent that understanding may be properly shown and accepted by the court, no
section 68a set-off issue arises since no surplus is presented should the foreclosure of the
creditor produce more proceeds than necessary to cover the first debt. Rather, one finds fullyused-up collateral as it is devoted, hypothetically, to both debts' satisfaction. J. MACLACHLAN,
THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 288 (1956).
In Gibson, the foregoing explains the court's conclusion to allow set-off from the proceeds
of the collateral sale against additional debt of the bankrupt to the foreclosing creditor. The
court held that since the collateral in Gibson had been given to secure a running indebtedness,
that would seem to have included the additional debt for which the creditor sought to devote the
proceeds. 171 F.2d at 400. Although the court did resolve the appeal in Gibson in favor of the
creditor by citing the set-off provision, that case should be understood to stand, along with
Wolf v. Aero Factors Corp., 221 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1955) and Brislin v. Killanna Holding Corp.,
85 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1936), for the proposition that proceeds from the collateral foreclosure are
not surplus proceeds where the parties have agreed to secure several debts or a continuing
indebtedness by the same piece of collateral. It may well be true that parties in the position of
the Pabst case do so intend. In that situation, however, the issue is not set-off of surplus
security but no surplus at all.

BANKRUPTCY
RAILROAD REORGANIZATION

The troublesome area of railroad reorganization 5" presented an important issue for the Seventh Circuit's resolution in the case of In re
In re Searles, 200 F. 893 (E.D.N.Y. 1912), which later was disapproved of in In re Autler,
23 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), seems contrary to the position taken here and in Gibson,
Wolf, and Brislin. Searles presented a case in which the creditor held two notes of the
bankrupt, of which one was secured. Foreclosure produced a surplus with which the creditor
sought to pay off his other note. As in Pabst,the trustee sought the surplus and creditor argued
set-off. The court denied the trustee's turnover motion and amended the creditor's claim
against the estate by the amount of the surplus. It is submitted that Searles is explained by
examination of the incorrect argument upon which the trustee heavily depended. The trustee
contended that since the creditor had filed and proved a claim against the estate for the full
amount of the unsecured note, and since the creditor was thereafter shown to have security for
the note (the surplus proceeds), the creditor should be estopped from set-off because of a
failure to note in his claim the security he held for the note on which claim was made. The court
notes in reaching its decision that no estoppel is made out on such facts by the trustee, since no
other creditors had changed position in reliance on the representation made in the creditor's
filed claim. 200 F. at 894. This estoppel argument of the trustee was thus as bad on the facts of
that case as it is on the law since the court thereby seems genuinely uninformed on the set-off
provision which received no substantive discussion in the opinion. On this view, then, Searles
stands only for the estoppel argument considered and lacks precedential weight on the issue of
when section 68a set-off may be allowed.
55. The whole area of railroad reorganization is sometimes needlessly troublesome. For
example, the recent case of National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Blanchette, 551 F.2d 127 (7th Cir.
1977), put a noteworthy series of events before the court which led to a ruling that is without
special significance to the law on reorganization court jurisdiction. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Act
§ 77a, I I U.S.C. § 205 (1970), the reorganization court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters of
reorganization. In this decision the Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court of Northern
Indiana on the ground that matters on which the district court had ruled fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania reorganization court of the Penn Central railroad.
Amtrak and the Penn Central trustees had agreed (with the approval of the reorganization
court) to arbitrate certain disputes that could arise under the so-called National Passenger
Corporation Agreement of April 16, 1971 (the "basic agreement") which was mandated by the
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501, 561(a) (1970). The agreement provided,
inter alia, that Penn Central would maintain certain lines, about which a dispute arose that
ultimately was decided by the arbitration clause in the basic agreement. However, though the
basic agreement provided that judgment might be entered in any federal district court on any
arbitration award, the reorganization court's approval of the basic agreement was premised on
the submission to that court for its approval any arbitration award agreement before the debtor
or trustees would become finally bound by it.
An award was rendered in the favor of Amtrak and eventually Amtrak took the award to
the Indiana district court for confirmation. The flight to Indiana for the confirmation saw no
resistance then by the trustees since Amtrak counsel, by memorandum of record in the
reorganization court, assured that "any judgment entered by the Indianapolis District Court
upon Amtrak's Petition to Confirm will not . . . [become] finally binding upon the Trustees."
551 F.2d at 132. Amtrak's then declared motive seemed only to liquidate its claim for purposes
of provability aqainst the estate before the reorganization court. The trustees thereby claim to
have consented to the Indiana judgment confirming the award in March 1976.
Next, Amtrak petitioned the reorganization court for enforcement of its confirmed award.
When the trustees answered this petition by claiming that the award could not be enforced since
the disputed lines had been conveyed to ConRail under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973, 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-793 (Supp. IV 1974), and thereby Penn Central's obligation had
terminated, Amtrak returned again to the Indiana court in May 1976 and sought there a
declaratory judgment to provide a show cause order on Penn Central why a quarterly schedule
for the restoration of track had not been submitted to Amtrak as required by the confirmation
order of March.
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Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad.56 The issue in Rock Island
concerned the appropriate findings by which the reorganization court may
authorize the trustee's issuance of certificates to raise funds for the repair,
rehabilitation and maintenance of a railroad, as well as funds for long-term
locomotive leases. 5" The issuance of certificates for these purposes in the
reorganization of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, prior to the
development of a reorganization plan, has the legal effect of granting
priority to the holders of the certificates as a first lien on all of the property
of the debtor railroad. 58 Not surprisingly, in such circumstances, the creditors of the railroad will object to the proposal of the trustee since their
59
priority rank legally lessens and their collateral potentially diminishes.
Over the past decade, through railroad reorganization litigation largely
involving the Penn Central railroad,' the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has
set forth two tests 6 I by which the reorganization court may determine
whether the pre-plan funding proposal of the trustee protects the equitable,
statutory and, ultimately, the constitutional rights of pre-reorganization
creditors.62 These Third Circuit decisions apply a strict standard, the Third
A venue test,63 to the expenditure of funds for operations, as compared to the
The Indiana court ordered that its March confirmation judgment was res judicata on the
arbitral issues including the question of the effect of the ConRail transfer of the following
month, which not merely had yet to come about, but about which the trustees made no
argument or objection in the Indiana court pursuant to the Amtrak memorandum noted above.
This Indiana sally by Amtrak was met by a late thrust in the reorganization court whereby the
trustees obtained an injunction against Amtrak's judicially trafficking elsewhere on the matter
with an appeal to the Seventh Circuit of the latest Indiana ruling expressly excepted. 551 F.2d at
133.
In what seems to be the only reasonable choice in the case, the Seventh Circuit reversed
the later Indiana order, including its recitation of its res judicata effects, on the ground that the
matter was properly justiciable in the reorgahization court. Id. at 136. Of course, the comings
and goings of counsel for and against the Penn Central will come eventually to be recorded in
more colorful detail where hopefully one may finally learn which plane Amtrak counsel took to
Indiana.
56. 545 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter referred to in text as Rock Island].
57. Bankruptcy Act § 77c(3), 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(3) (1970).
58. Id.
59. The economic effect is nicely described by the court in one of the Penn Central
appeals to the Third Circuit, In re Penn Central Transp. Co. (Columbus Option), 494 F.2d 270,
277-78 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Columbus Option].
60. The leading cases arising out of the various Third Circuit decisions involving the
reorganization of Penn Central are Columbus Option, supra note 59; In re Penn Central
Transp. Co. (Selkirk Yard), 474 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Selkirk Yard]; In re
Penn Central Transp. Co. (Mortgage Releases), 468 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1972); Central R.R. of
N.J. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 421 F. 2d 604 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 949
(1970). See generally In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1952). See also In re
Boston and Maine Corp., 484 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1973); In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.
1971); In re Yale Express System, Inc., 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967).
61. Hereinafter referred to in the text and footnotes as the Third Avenue test and the
Jersey Central test. See notes 63 and 64 infra.
62. As discussed in text accompanying notes 68-71 infra, it is not clear whether the Third
Circuit views these tests as constitutionally required or as simply meeting the constitutional
standard.
63. Of great influence to the present position of the Third Circuit has been the opinion of
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to capital assets, to which
expenditure of funds for additions or betterments
64
a less strict Jersey Central test applies.
The Third Circuit emphasizes the use and not the source of the funds
sought in determining whether the Third Avenue or Jersey Central test
applies in the particular trustee proposal. 65 The use analysis assumes that the
economic effect on extant creditors is more drastic where the funds are to be
used for operations 66 whereas the use of funds to better or add to assets of
the railroad, on the other hand, requires a lesser standard because the
expenditure more likely expands the railroad's assets that are potentially
available to satisfy creditor claims. 67
Rock Island construes the Third Circuit developments as having
elevated the Third A venue test to a constitutional requirement, necessitated,
in the Third Circuit's judgment, by the fifth amendment to avoid unconstitutional diminishment of creditor collateral. 68 With directness, the Seventh
Circuit disagreed that the amendment requires so strict a test, stating that
Judge Jerome Frank in Third Ave. Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1952), in which Judge
Frank reversed a reorganization court's authorization of trustees to take half a million dollars
from a fund of the first mortgagees containing proceeds from the disposal of mortgaged
properties. The trustees in Third Avenue believed that trustee certificates would have been
more costly and funds were required for working capital. Judge Frank indicated that seizure of
the debtor's property in the hands of a mortgagee could be permitted, but the necessary proof
of a most extraordinary circumstance would be necessary. Specifically, the court held there
must be findings both of a "high degree of likelihood (a) that the debtor can be reorganized...
within a reasonable time, and (b) that the secured creditors whose security is being compulsorily loaned will not be injured." Id. at 706-07. The court remanded Third Avenue as no findings
had been made consistent with these standards. Of interest also was the court's note of the
looming fifth amendment issue, should reorganization courts overstep their authority in affecting creditors. Id. at 707.
64. The Jersey Central test, first seen in Central R.R. of N.J. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 421 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1970), provides a lesser standard for the trustee to satisfy in
seeking certain financing goals. Where the trustee seeks funds by which to make additions to,
or betterment of, the mortgaged property, he may convert capital assets to cash if the funds are
unavailable otherwise, reorganization is probably feasible, the money obtained will materially
contribute to possibility of a successful reorganization and to continuation as a going concern,
and if thereby the interests of bondholders will not be prejudiced. Id. at 606. See Selkirk Yard,
supra note 60, and Columbus Option, supra note 59.
65. By "use" is meant for what purpose the trustee proposes acquiring the funds; by
"source," from where the funds will come.
66. Columbus Option, supra note 59, at 284, applied the stricter Third Avenue test where
the sources proposed included only property theretofore unencumbered by pre-reorganization
creditors, and proposed to be used for operational financing.
67. Selkirk Yard, supra note 60, at 836, applied the less strict Jersey Centraltest where the
source was to be mortgaged property or its proceeds and the use was additions or betterment to
road property and not operational.
68. The theory is that to the extent priority is lost to new holders of claims against the
estate with a higher legal priority than existing creditors (through issuance of trustee certificates
under the Bankruptcy Act § 77c(3), It U.S.C. § 205(c)(3) (1970)), previous creditors have
suffered a taking of their property under the fifth amendment without due process of law.
Supreme Court cases make clear that Congress' power to make bankruptcy law is limited by the
fifth amendment, although the precise extent of creditor protection in circumstances as in the
instant cases is not at all clear. See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102
(1974); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
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"the Fifth Amendment . . .is not violated by anything less than actual
impairment of a creditor's security.' '69 Though one must grant that the Third
Circuit's opinion in In re Penn Central Transportation Co. (Columbus
Option)70 may be so read, another plausible reading of both Columbus
Option and its antecedent, Third Avenue, leads one to conclude that these
courts prescribed a strongly creditor-protectionist test to satisfy the statutory
and equitable rights of creditors even if something less could have satisfied
constitutional rights. 71 Moreover, one may err in assuming that the difference of opinion between these circuit courts, even if on constitutional and
not statutory/equitable grounds, is of broad range. The analysis below
suggests that the disagreement exhibited in Rock Island may be less than is
apparent since these cases are substantially distinguishable.
As noted, the Third Circuit emphasized the use to which the reorganization trustee proposed putting the funds sought and seems to have treated
the source as effectively immaterial. 72 Specifically, the court applied the
more rigorous Third Avenue 73 test in Columbus Option, 7 wherein the
property to be used to attract funds had not previously been subjected to the
claims of creditors who were opposing the trustee proposal.7 5 Only one year
earlier the same court applied the less strict Jersey Central test76 in the case
of In re Penn Central Transportation Co. (Selkirk Yard),77 wherein the
property to be used to obtain funds for additions and betterment of the yard
was proceeds of the disposal of mortgaged property of the creditors who
opposed the proposal. Selkirk Yard followed the decision of the earlier
Third Circuit case of In re Penn Central TransportationCo. (Mortgage
Releases)7 8 under the same use and source facts.
69. 545 F.2d at 1090.
70. 494 F.2d 270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974) [hereinafter referred to in text
as Columbus Option].
71. Again, resolution of the holdings of Rock Island and the Third Circuit cases does not
require decision of constitutional scope. Creditor protection, notably secured credit protection,
arises not only from the fifth amendment, but also from the statutory scheme of the bankruptcy
law as well as antecedent equitable receivership law out of which the reorganization law came.
The statutory/equitable test of creditor protection need not be co-extensive with the outer limit
of the amendment. There may even be a greater protection afforded by the former, as is implicit
in the Rock Island opinion. The seminal Third Avenue opinion of Judge Jerome Frank only
notes the possible clash with the amendment. Even Columbus Option seems better read as
imposing Third Avenue's strict test "to insure that the reorganization court is not engaged in an
intentional uncompensated taking." 494 F.2d at 279. Third Avenue seems compelled by prudence and not by the Constitution.
72. See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
73. See note 63 supra.
74. See notes 59 and 60 supra.
75. However, the subject property secured the lien of the trustee certificates. See notes
59, 65 and 66 supra.
76. See note 64 supra.
77. 474 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Selkirk Yard].
78. 468 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1972).
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Rock Island presented a proposal of the trustee which contemplated
both operational and capital uses of the funds whose source was unlike any
of the Third Circuit precedents, where the use proposed had been either
operational or capital. In addition, unlike all of the Third Circuit precedents, save arguably Columbus Option ,79 the source of the Rock Island
funds was issuance of trustee certificates and not disposal of mortgaged
property or proceeds thereof. One should consider whether the Seventh
Circuit's disregard in reaching its decision, 80 of the use to which the funds
would be put, in favor of its cryptic dictum about the constitutional protection extending simply to "actual impairment of a creditor's security," 8 '
leaves open to that court alternatives far closer to the strict Third Avenue
test than might appear. Where mortgaged property is proposed to fund either
operational or capital expenditure, nothing inconsistent nor incoherent
would appear from the Seventh Circuit's adoption of a test even stricter than
Third Avenue 82 Before one assumes the difference of opinion gratuitously
presented by Rock Island on the constitutional issue really marks substantially divergent opinion on the statutory or equitable protection of creditors,
consideration must be accorded the distinguishing factors among these cases
on the extent of protection each accords creditors.
The extent of the difference in analysis between these cases lies in the
focus of the Third Circuit on use and the arguable focus of the Seventh
Circuit on source. Construing the Seventh Circuit's constitutional dictum as
its decision to bar invasion of mortgaged property or its proceeds-a
construction concededly conjectural, unless strongly optimistic findings
favoring successful reorganization are offered in support--one finds little if
any disagreement of principle or analysis from the Third Circuit decisions.
Examination of the Third Circuit decisions reveals that Rock Island substantially presents different factors. The Third Circuit cases hold that where the
use proposed is capital, and the source proposed is mortgaged property or
proceeds, the less strict Jersey Centraltest applies; where the use proposed
is operational, and the source proposed is unmortgaged property, the stricter
Third Avenue test applies. Thus, one may securely infer that the stricter
test, Third Avenue, applies where the proposed use is operational and the
79. Columbus Option proposed financing from several sources all encumbered already by
trustee certificate issue.
80. By "disregard" it is meant only that Rock Island is read as holding the use to be
immaterial to the result explicitly. The court did recite the proposed use and, of course, would
disapprove outlandish uses, but it entertained no contention of such a use in the case presented.
81. 545 F.2d at 1090. The court's cryptic dictum may mean different things to different
people. See, e.g., note 82 infra.
82. That is, the dictum may mean that the protection of Third Avenue does not pass
constitutional analysis because use of the mortgaged property is an "actual impairment of a
creditor's security." Id.
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proposed source is mortgaged property. However, one also may securely
infer that the less strict test applies where the proposed use is capital and the
proposed source is unmortgaged property. When Rock Island proposes both
operational and capital uses out of the same source, that is, trustee certificates and not (legally) mortgaged property, the only Third Circuit precedent
on point is Columbus Option, and that bears only on the operational part of
the Rock Island case.
Yet, even as to the part of the use proposed in Rock Island for which
arguably Columbus Option stands as precedent, an important distinction
between the two cases obtains. The unencumbered source property in
Columbus Option was at the time unencumbered only in the respect that the
opposed creditors held no liens thereon, but it is inaccurate to say that the
source was unencumbered, since by then trustee certificate issues had placed
a first lien on the property in favor of the United States, who argued in favor
of the trustee's proposal. 8 3 Contrariwise, in Rock Island, the trustee certificates proposed to attract funding were not preceded by an earlier encumbrance.84 Without doubt, this last distinction need not have been crucial to the
85
actual economic erosion of the Rock Island creditor interests in either case,
though in neither circuit has actual economic erosion become the controlling
consideration. 8 6 However, when coupled with the other plainly relevant
factors, including prospects of successful reorganization, alternative sources
of funds, timing of the proposal and the public interest effect, the actual
economic effect may be quite an overwhelming consideration completely
separating the Columbus Option case from the Rock Island. The prejudicial
effect on creditors of the Columbus Option proposal to fund operational use
through a previously tapped and encumbered source seems distinctly stronger than the effect on creditors of the Rock Island proposal to fund both
capital and operational uses out of a previously untapped source. For courts
to have applied a stricter test in the former and a lesser in the latter seems
proper under the statutory and equitable protection enjoyed by creditors.
For these reasons it seems premature to suppose that any real difference
of agreement obtains between these circuit courts besides the problematical
but unnecessary disagreement about whether the stricter Third Avenue test
is constitutionally required.8 7 This conclusion is borne out even more
strongly by the findings of the Rock Island reorganization court with which
the Seventh Circuit supported its conclusion that the reorganization court
had not abused its discretion in authorizing the trustee's proposal 8 as these
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Columbus Option, supra note 59, at 275.
545 F.2d at 1088.
See the discussion of economic effect in Columbus Option, supra note 59.
Id.
See note 71 supra.
545 F.2d at 1090-91.
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findings sufficiently mirror the standards provided by the Third Circuit's
less strict Jersey Central test. The reorganization court found that "reorganization is not clearly impossible:" 89 that the proposal was "essential to
the continued operations of the road;" and that these expenditures would
have a "direct beneficial effect on profitability. "9 Given additionally that
alternative funding was practically impossible,9 1 these findings seem quite
sufficient under Jersey Central since the only missing Jersey Central factor
of whether thereby the creditors would be prejudiced, seems likewise
satisfied here if the invasion of mortgaged property in Selkirk Yard could
have been sanctioned by the Third Circuit. 92
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1088 & n.2.
92. The "thereby prejudice creditors" element seems only to be conclusory from the
other elements of the Jersey Central test. But, possibly it means that if the source of the funds
be mortgaged property, prejudice to creditors arises and then Third Avenue needs to be
satisfied, although as the text points out Selkirk Yard convincingly suggests otherwise.

